

Designed to help owners and managers of nightlife establishments develop a safe nightlife atmosphere.

BEST PRACTICES for **NIGHTLIFE** **ESTABLISHMENTS**



Table of Contents

Message from Chief of Police Cathy L. Lanier	3
Developing a Safe Nightlife Atmosphere	
Security	5
Intoxication	7
Sexual Assaults	8
Employees	9
Age Verification	9
Promoters	10
Establishment Policies/Security Plans	10
Police-Community Relations	11
Response to Crimes and Serious Incidents: “The Crime Scene”	
Pre-Incident	13
Post-Incident	13
Relevant DC Official Code Sections	14
Nightclub	16
Fire Safety Best Practices	16
Counterterrorism Best Practices	
Terrorist Strategy	19
Terrorist Goals	19
Terrorist Target Selection	19
Terrorism and the Nightlife Industry	19
Terrorists View Nightlife Businesses as Attractive Targets for Attacks	20
Characteristics of Terrorist Attacks	20
Counterterrorism Awareness and Response Plans for Nightlife Establishments	20
Physical Security and Counterterrorism	21
Video Surveillance Systems in Counterterrorism Efforts	22
Searching Establishments as Part of a Counterterrorism Security Plan	22
Door Supervisors	22
Evacuation Plan	22
Communications	23
Hostile Surveillance	23
Identification of Suicide Bombers	23
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)	24
Recommendations	24
Attachments	25
MPD iWATCH Bomb Threat Checklist	26
Guidelines for Suspicious Mail or Packages	27
MPD iWATCH Criminal Description Form	28
“If You See Something, Say Something” Poster	29
Incident Report	30

Message from Chief of Police Cathy L. Lanier

The District of Columbia has a vibrant, thriving nightlife scene, with restaurants, bars, nightclubs and music venues in neighborhoods across the city. It is your responsibility as establishment owners and managers to ensure that your customers enjoy the evening as safely as possible. These precautions help create a positive relationship between you and your neighbors, and they help ensure that your establishment is free from any illegal activity.



The Metropolitan Police Department has developed the following guidebook, which includes sections on developing a safe nightlife atmosphere; responding to serious criminal incidents; fire prevention; and counterterrorism best practices. Establishment owners and managers are strongly encouraged to review the sections in this guidebook to ensure that you are adequately prepared to handle any day-to-day or unexpected incidents or crimes that might happen.

District Commanders and establishment owners should meet as necessary to discuss public safety, citizen concerns, operational issues, and solutions to problems. In the interest of fostering stronger police-community relationships, owners and managers are also welcome to attend local Police Service Area (PSA) meetings, which are generally held on a monthly basis. Not only will these meetings provide you with yet another means to connect with the community, but you will also have the opportunity to get to know the officers who patrol your beat and who will be responding to any calls for service on your behalf. Visit the MPD's website at mpdc.dc.gov for information on your police district and details on upcoming PSA meetings.

Cathy L. Lanier
Chief of Police

Developing a Safe Nightlife Atmosphere

The goal of this document is to assist owners and managers of nightlife establishments in maintaining safe bars, taverns, restaurant-lounges and clubs free from illegal activity including: drug sales and use, underage drinking, over consumption of alcohol, violence, prostitution, sex offenses and other crimes.

The Metropolitan Police Department has adopted and expanded these guidelines as suggested ways to achieve that goal.* They are meant as a general road map for owners and managers, not as a list of laws applicable to all establishments and all situations. We have also included separate sections regarding how to respond to a serious criminal incident and what you should know about counterterrorism threats and preparedness. Use your best judgment while keeping these suggestions in mind and adapting them to your specific establishment.

When an establishment wishes to have a police presence at a venue which falls under the purview of DC Official Code § 25-798 (Reimbursable Details), the establishment should contact the MPD Patrol Services and School Security Bureau (PSSSB) ABC Detail Coordinator at (202) 576-6600 or psssb.adminbox@dc.gov to receive further instructions and guidelines.

Establishments are reminded that security plans should be established consistent with DC Official Code § 25-402 (New license application for manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer) that include, but are not limited to:

- a. A statement on the type of security training provided for, and completed by, establishment personnel, including conflict resolution training, procedures for handling violent incidents, other emergencies, and calling the Metropolitan Police Department, and procedures for crowd control and preventing overcrowding.
- b. The establishment's procedures for permitting patrons to enter.
- c. How security personnel are stationed inside and in front of the establishment and the number and location of surveillance cameras used by the establishment.
- d. Procedures in place to prevent patrons from becoming intoxicated and ensuring that only persons 21 years or older are served alcohol.
- e. How the establishment maintains an incident log.
- f. The establishment's procedures for preserving a crime scene.
- g. In the event that cameras are required to be installed by the Board or in accordance with the establishment's security plan, the establishment shall ensure that the cameras utilized by the establishment are operational; any footage of a crime of violence or a crime involving a gun is maintained for a minimum of 30 days, and the security footage is made available within 48 hours upon the request of The Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Administration (ABRA) or the Metropolitan Police Department.

Establishments should also consider incorporating the development of a counterterrorism security plan as described in the "Counterterrorism Best Practices" section of this guide.

Establishments must ensure their employees call 911 to report criminal activity or serious medical emergencies such as drug overdoses. Establishments are also reminded that they may call 911 or otherwise notify police for assistance when a patron is ejected.

Security

1. As a general guideline, there should be a minimum of one special police officer (SPO) in every establishment when 50 or more patrons are present at the same time. For larger premises, there should be one SPO for every 50 club patrons present. Any full time security supervisor should be included when counting the total number of security personnel employed. Discretion should be used by management to determine the appropriate number of security personnel based on the event or crowd to ensure safety and lawfulness.

*These guidelines are adopted and expanded from the "Best Practices for Nightlife Establishments," published by the New York City Police Department and the New York Nightlife Association (2nd Ed., 2011)

2. Establishments are reminded that SPOs and their agencies must be licensed through the MPD Security Officers Management Branch (SOMB).
3. Establishment owners should ensure employees are adequately trained for their positions. This training should include security training for security personnel that includes techniques to de-escalate potential violent encounters and difficult situations as well as alcohol awareness training for bar staff. Training should be completed within 30 days of hire with refresher training offered on an annual basis.
4. Establishment policy should mandate an ejection protocol. The protocol should contain:
 - a. Procedures for security to separate and remove all disorderly or potentially violent patrons in a manner consistent with the law that is designed to prevent a continuation of violent activity inside or outside the club.
 - b. Procedures for handing unruly or violent patrons over to MPD.
5. It is recommended that for every five (5) security guards/SPOs there be one (1) security supervisor to ensure a minimum span of control of one (1) security supervisor for every five (5) subordinates.
6. It is recommended that security guards/SPOs be distinctively and uniformly attired – very easily identified.
7. It is recommended that security guards/SPOs be spread-out and roaming throughout the establishment and not just stationed at the door.
8. Customers should be encouraged to check coats and bags in order to avoid thefts. Coat check should include the customer's ability to check bags. It is recommended that establishments install anti-theft environmental designs such as drawers, shelves and hooks for customers who choose not to check bags. Ensure control and order are maintained in the coat check area, especially at closing time.
9. Security personnel and/or establishment staff should periodically monitor restrooms for unusual behavior (e.g., more than one person in a stall).
10. Individuals suspected of committing a crime should be detained by security through lawful means. Victims of, and witnesses to crimes should be encouraged to wait for the police to arrive in order to assist in the investigation. At a minimum, they should be asked to provide their identifying information so that they may be contacted by the police in the future. They should also be encouraged to make a statement to establishment personnel regarding the incident, if the establishment so requests.
11. Establishments should encourage employee witnesses to go to court and testify when requested, and should pay wages to them for their time.
12. Identifying information on ejected and/or arrested patrons should be retained on a "barred list" database. Patrons who have been barred should not be allowed subsequent re-entry.
13. It is recommended that functioning and properly maintained surveillance cameras be mounted, at a minimum, to show patrons entering and exiting establishments and to show patrons entering and exiting restrooms. When possible, establishments should ensure cameras provide coverage for all blind spots, entrances, exits, service areas, hallways, stairwells, dance floors, and where necessary, outward toward parking lots, and customer care areas, if they exist.
 - a. It is recommended that the establishment have protocols in place to ensure selected employees are trained on how to operate the system correctly, all cameras are checked on a periodic basis to ensure they are working properly, and footage is maintained and is available if needed.
 - b. The establishment should maintain a diagram of the floor plan that includes the location of all security cameras. Establishments should keep this information with their security plan.
 - c. Establishments should maintain recordings for 30 days.
 - d. Establishments should provide recordings, within 48 hours, to MPD and/or ABRA upon request.
14. Digital video of any unlawful conduct should be identified and provided, within 48 hours, to the MPD and/or ABRA when requested.
15. In order to ensure that all efforts are working, an establishment should hire an independent security consultant to evaluate procedures and assess compliance with established policies and laws.

16. Ensure that levels of lighting inside and outside the establishment are sufficient for observation by security.
17. Patrons awaiting admission should be placed in a line, not blocking the sidewalk. All individuals in admission lines should be informed that if they are not orderly, they will not be admitted. Individuals who will not be admitted should be encouraged to leave the area.
18. At closing, security is to ensure orderliness as patrons are exiting the establishment and that patrons depart the area in a timely manner.
19. If metal detectors are used for entry, every patron should be scanned by magnetometer in accordance with establishment policy. VIPs, DJs, promoters, entourages, etc. should not receive special treatment and should likewise be scanned.
20. Larger establishments should designate a customer care area to facilitate the rendering of aid and on-scene investigations.
21. Establishments should safeguard evidence connected with commission of a crime on the premises and should isolate and preserve any area in which a crime was committed in order to maintain the integrity of any crime scene.
22. Management should periodically review the Security Plan, Voluntary Agreement, and applicable laws and regulations with employees at staff meetings. Spot checks of employees should be conducted to ensure compliance with establishment policies and applicable laws and rules, including compliance tests for false ID and underage sales. Establishments should consider conducting background checks on security personnel, or at a minimum, security managers/heads of security.
23. Management should know and make readily available to security staff/all bar staff the telephone number of the local police district and the number of the Watch Commander, if applicable.

Intoxication

1. DC law and common sense prohibit a nightlife establishment from serving alcohol to a person who is intoxicated or appears to be intoxicated, or permitting someone else to serve the intoxicated person. It is of course in the best interest of everyone involved to prevent incidents and the kinds of behavior which are associated with intoxicated patrons. All employees should be highly aware of the signs of intoxication:
 - a. Speech slurred, thick, confused, abusive, profane, antagonistic or incoherent.
 - b. Appearance in disarray; clothing stained.
 - c. Balance unsteady, or body swaying, using a wall or furniture as a prop.
 - d. Face pale or flushed.
 - e. Eyes bloodshot, red, or puffy.
 - f. Fumbling or dropping of glass, ID, cash, etc., or misjudging distance.
 - g. Unusual physiological symptoms, e.g., vomiting, excessive hiccupping, losing focus, sleepy or fainting.
2. Nightlife establishments should ensure that all employees maintain continual awareness of the level of intoxication of patrons, as well as whether individuals are buying drinks for others who may have in fact been cut off. Employees must notify associates of an intoxicated person if they are present, so they may watch over the individual, provide for the safety of the intoxicated person, and (if necessary) assist in escorting the intoxicated person from the establishment.

Sexual Assaults

1. Management and employees can help to prevent their premises from being exploited by sexual aggressors, who may seek to take advantage of vulnerable patrons. Alcohol is the most common substance aggressors use to facilitate sexual assault. Both the aggressor and the target may have impaired judgment and lower awareness as a result of alcohol consumption, leading to a greater chance of sexual violation anywhere along the spectrum from harassment to violent assault. However, the environment around a sexual aggressor can make a difference in their behavior.
2. Young women are statistically most likely to be the target of unwanted sexual attention and aggression, but it's important to keep in mind that anyone may be a target, including patrons of gay establishments. Aggressors often present themselves as friendly, seeking to get to know a target, buying them drinks, or otherwise displaying a romantic interest. Aggressors may also engage in unwanted contact such as pressing up against someone on the dance floor, groping, or "up-skirt" grabbing. If bar staff notice any of these behaviors, it may be useful for them to ask the target if s/he would like any intervention and/or keep a close eye on the situation in case it escalates.

Escalation can also take place off-premises. A common scenario is for an aggressor to initiate an interaction on the premises, isolate the target from her friends, and then persuade or pressure the target to leave with him. Employees should be attuned to behavior that seems overly familiar or aggressive under the circumstances, especially if the potential target is visibly intoxicated or seems to be impaired.

3. Establishment personnel should offer to call a cab for the vulnerable or impaired person, and closely observe as patrons leave to see if they seem to be able to navigate safely. Security personnel at the door or outside are well positioned and should observe when patrons leave. They should also take general note of whom patrons arrive with and whether they leave with the same group or someone else. Note that aggressors may seek to get targets drunk or drugged, encourage them to get some air, and then pull up in a car or hail a cab to take them away.
4. If establishment personnel sense that something is awry, either when an aggressor is purchasing drinks for a potential target who is visibly intoxicated, isolating her from her friends, or trying to leave with her, personnel should make it clear to the aggressor that they have been observed by asking them in front of others how they're doing or if they need some help. Staff can also use distraction techniques to separate the target from the aggressor, such as telling the potential target that her friends are looking for her. If possible, employees should make a note of the circumstances, the descriptions of the parties, or any other information that could become relevant at a later time. However, establishment managers and staff should make every effort to keep patrons safe and proactively intervene if they observe any suspicious or problematic behaviors.
5. Encourage groups to designate one person as a chaperone and perhaps identify this person with a wristband. This person could be served non-alcoholic beverages at a discount for the night.
6. For prevention of assaults on the premises, maintain surveillance cameras outside restroom doors, and consider employing a restroom attendant. Ensure that restrooms are used by the appropriate gender. If the restrooms are gender-segregated, monitor to ensure that men do not enter the women's restroom (keeping in mind that some people who appear to be one gender may in fact be another). Surveillance cameras should be monitored throughout the night, especially near closing time. Ensure that storage areas and other restricted areas are kept locked and secured. Closed darkened areas create a potential danger.
7. Support staff, including porters, barbacks, busboys, and kitchen staff, should receive sexual assault awareness training that will help them be aware of patron behavior and recognize potential perpetrator behaviors that may lead to sexual assault, especially as these employees work in or pass through areas that are dark or restricted. As part of their training, employees should be instructed to immediately report any suspicious or problematic behavior to a supervisor or manager.
8. Establishments can send a clear message that there is zero tolerance for sexual assault by posting signs letting patrons know that their safety is priority, and including on the signs who among the staff a patron can approach if they need assistance.

9. Perhaps most important, management and employees should trust their instincts regarding possible predatory behavior they may observe. If something doesn't seem right, it probably isn't. Management should communicate to employees, ideally by establishing a written policy, that they support proactive efforts to address suspicious, aggressive, or predatory behavior. If possible, employees should make notes of any situation they observed for later reference if needed.

Employees

1. All employees must have a photo ID on file in the establishment, with a description of his/her position and contact information. Consider using ID scanning not only for patrons (see below) but also for employees, to identify all employees on the premises. All employee identification information and personnel files should be made available to MPD and ABRA upon request.
2. Establishments should also maintain a file of contact information for all individuals contracted to provide operational services such as DJs, security personnel, lighting and sound technicians and promoters.
3. Establishments must designate a specific person to be in charge of the premises at all times. The name and phone number of both the manager and the person designated to be in charge of the premises, if different, during the hours of operation, must be available to MPD and ABRA on request.
4. Establishment owners and managers should discourage employees from drinking alcoholic beverages while on duty and overseeing the safety of others.
5. Establishments should designate clean-up crews inside and outside the venue. Empty glasses and unnecessary loose items, which could be used as projectiles during any possible disagreement between or among patrons, should be collected on a recurring basis. All flyers, handbills, cups, debris, etc. should be cleaned from in front of the premises throughout the night.
6. Establishments should designate specific employees to conduct occupancy counts periodically throughout the night and inspect fire exits and egress paths to ensure they are clear.
7. Managers should identify themselves to and fully cooperate with representatives of responding government agencies consistent with **DC Official Code § 25-823(5)**.

Age Verification

1. **DC Official Code §25-1002(b)(3)** specifies the types of documents that are acceptable proof of age for the purpose of purchasing alcohol in the District of Columbia. DC Official Code §25-1002(b)(3) states: "For the purpose of determining valid representation of age, each person shall be required to present to the establishment owner or representative at least one form of valid identification, which shall have been issued by an agency of government (local, state, federal, or foreign) and shall contain the name, date of birth, signature, and photograph of the individual."
2. ID should be checked for every person seeking to purchase, obtain, possess, or consume alcohol, who reasonably appears to be less than 21 years of age. There should be no exceptions made to this policy, including for anyone brought into the premises by an employee or promoter. Management should make it clear to promoters, DJs and others that they are not to steer underage patrons around security in order to evade ID checks. If an establishment is not using wristbands or other means to distinguish minors from other patrons, the establishment should conduct a second check of the ID at the time of purchase, in addition to the time of entry into the establishment.
3. Establishments should direct their employees to take advantage of the free compliance training classes offered by ABRA. This training includes instruction on identifying false identification.

Promoters

1. Establishments which contract with promoters will be held responsible if promoters engage in or encourage irresponsible or unsafe activity in the premises. Therefore it is incumbent upon management to take adequate precautions when dealing with promoters, who are much less likely to suffer the consequences of illegal conduct, incidents or administrative violations than the establishment itself. Establishments should work with promoters who have proven records of responsible performance with the nightlife industry, MPD and ABRA.
2. Establishments should only work with promoters who are professional. Promoters should be required to provide full contact information for themselves and anyone they hire to work in the establishment. If the promoter is insured, the venue should be listed as an additional insured on all relevant policies.
3. Establishments should require that all promotional materials be approved by the venue prior to being published or released to the public.
4. Establishments should make absolutely clear to promoters what their policies are, especially regarding admission of those under 21 years of age, and make clear that promoters are expected to fully adhere to these policies.
5. Establishments should have representation at the door to ensure that all door policies are adhered to by promoters and their employees. Management should reserve the right to refuse entrance to any guest pursuant to their existing admission policies.
6. All guests and members of the promotional team must be treated the same as all other patrons, with respect to the establishment's search and ID checking policies.
7. Establishments should check the past performance of promoters before considering contracting with them, by inquiring with other venues about what type of crowd they attract, how they operate, and how responsive they are to problems or concerns.
8. Establishments are reminded that promoters must abide by the ABRA license (For instance, promoters cannot charge a cover charge where the licensee has not obtained that privilege from the ABC Board).

Establishment Policies/Security Plans

NOTE: Establishment policies and security plans should be clear and well known by the establishment's employees.

1. Written Security Plans are now required under DC Official Code §25-402(d) for Nightclubs, and may be required (at the discretion of the ABC Board) under **DC Official Code §25-402(e)** for restaurants, taverns or multi-purpose facilities.
2. Establishments should have policies in place to check the ID of any person attempting to purchase, obtain, possess, or consume alcohol.
3. If bottle purchases are allowed, establishments must take sufficient steps to ensure that the tables are closely monitored to prevent underage drinking or over consumption.
4. **DC Official Code §25-402(f)** sets forth the elements to be included in a Security Plan. An establishment security plan should be in the premises at all times and should be distributed and reviewed by all employees. The security plan should to the degree possible, incorporate the guidelines suggested in this document. The security plan should inform all employees how to handle situations that arise frequently and which often lead to problems, e.g.:
 - a. Illnesses or injuries from fights.
 - b. Disorderly patron (e.g., a patron who refuses search)
 - c. False ID, drug use, citizen arrest.
 - d. Recovered weapon.

5. The establishment security plan should also include:
 - a. Procedures for permitting patron entry.
 - b. Emergency evacuation plan.
 - c. Exit plan for a gradual staged exit prior to and at closing time to establish and maintain order inside and outside the premises.
 - d. Security training (e.g., conflict resolution, handling violent incidents, contacting MPD, crowd control, preventing overcrowding)
 - e. How security staff employees are stationed inside and outside of the establishment.
 - f. The number and locations of surveillance cameras.
 - g. Criteria for items to be entered into the establishment's "Activity and Incident Log."
6. A professional looking sign containing a patron code of conduct should be displayed inside the establishment, and the rules in this code of conduct should be enforced.
7. When an establishment has residential neighbors in the same block, establishments should post a sign at the exit(s) encouraging patrons to be quiet and sensitive to the neighbors as they depart the venue.
8. Establishments must keep all licenses and permits up to date and readily available for review.
9. Establishments must ensure that their policies are adhered to.
10. If a crime or serious incident occurs:
 - a. An incident report listing full details should be generated. See the "Attachments" section for a sample incident report.
 - b. The establishment staff should preserve the crime scene.
 - c. See "Response to Crimes and Serious Incidents" for information on responding to and dealing with crimes and serious incidents.

Police-Community Relations

1. Establishments should provide a list of all special events and types of entertainment which will significantly increase the influx of patrons and vehicles within the Police District in which they are located. Notifications should be sent to the appropriate District Commander 72 hours in advance. Establishments should refer to www.mpdc.gov/districts to determine within which district they are located.
2. For special events, establishments should have a search policy and adhere to it. (This may vary from no one being searched, to all bags being searched, to random searches being conducted, to everyone being searched.) This ensures that upon arrival, the responding MPD officials and the officers will have a basis to know if the occupants have been searched and what, if anything was found.
3. Representatives of establishments are welcome at Police Service Area (PSA) meetings, and should attend as many as possible.
4. The District Commander and establishment owners should meet as necessary to discuss public safety, citizen concerns, operational issues, and solutions to problems.

Response to Crimes and Serious Incidents: “The Crime Scene”

These best practices are designed to apply to crimes and serious incidents, usually assaults that are physical and/or sexual in nature. For these purposes assaults are deemed serious when the victim of the physical assault is either unconscious, or is obviously in need of immediate medical treatment, for a serious or life-threatening injury, such as a stabbing or slashing. This is more serious in nature than a bar fight with minor injuries. An exception to this general rule is sexual assault crimes where the victim may have no visible injuries. Sexual assaults are serious criminal incidents, and as such fall within the purview of these guidelines.

Pre-Incident

1. All establishments should maintain a list of all employees and independent contractors (such as DJs, promoters, and other entertainers) who are present on any individual night. Also maintained should be contact information for these employees to aid in contacting them as part of a post-incident investigation.
2. Establishments should request and maintain contact information for a representative of any private group who has a function or event at the establishment.

Post-Incident

1. Call 911 immediately.
2. Establishments should make clear to all managers, employees and private contractors that they are expected to provide the full truth and all the facts to police officers, officials and investigators.
3. Establishments must isolate and preserve the crime scene or incident scene. Do not clean up the crime scene. Protect it from any changes. Crime scenes can be protected by temporarily surrounding them with stanchions or yellow “caution” tape, using chairs, or even potted plants. To this end, inexpensive yellow “Caution Tape,” should be kept in the establishment.
4. Nightlife establishment employees should be aware that important physical evidence may not be readily visible or obvious. Incidents involving sexual assaults will rarely have recognizable evidence at the scene of the occurrence. Therefore, establishment employees should “overprotect” the area of the crime or incident by safeguarding an area larger than they initially believe the crime scene to be.
5. Establishments should immediately identify and preserve financial transaction information for all parties involved or who are believed to be witnesses. This includes debit and credit transactions.
6. Involved parties or witnesses should be detained for the arrival of police if possible. There are several techniques to accomplish this, including politely asking them to stay, offering them complimentary admission on a subsequent date, asking for and retaining copies of their IDs, and giving these copies to the responding police officers.
7. Establishments should know what parking facilities are commonly used by their patrons and provide this information to police investigators.
8. If the suspects or witnesses leave, a description of the vehicle in which they left (with license plate number), the direction and means by which they left, and the identity or description of any people with whom they left should be provided to the responding police officers.
9. The table or area where the involved parties sat or stood, including their beverage glasses, utensils, and any other evidence, should be preserved and left untouched. This material should be identified to the responding police officers immediately. Employees of nightlife establishments should be cognizant that in certain circumstances, tampering with physical evidence can be a crime. See, for example, **DC Official Code § 22-723**, “Tampering with physical evidence”.
10. Video of people inside the establishment during the evening the crime or incident took place should be preserved for the police, even if it appears to have no evidentiary value. Often these videos can be enhanced to reveal important evidence. To increase the usefulness of these images, establishments should ensure that sufficient lighting exists in all areas of the venue and that video surveillance files

are maintained, and provided to the responding police investigators.

11. If the establishment uses an ID scanner, the information should be preserved and made available to the responding police officers.
12. All crimes and incidents should be documented in the establishments' activity log or on an incident report form by a management level employee, who was present at the time of the incident. This manager need not have been a witness to the incident, but is responsible for interviewing the witnesses and documenting the pertinent information.
13. Obviously, these best practices and recommendations apply to crimes and incidents which occur inside and outside establishments. However, establishment employees must be aware that important evidence connected to a crime or incident which occurred inside the establishment may exist outside. For example, if an assault outside involved parties who were inside the establishment earlier, the evidence that the involved parties left behind must be safeguarded. This includes:
 - a. Financial records of their purchases.
 - b. Video surveillance images of involved parties.
 - c. If the establishment uses an ID scanner, images of scanned IDs.
 - d. Glasses and utensils used by the involved parties, which may yield identifying information such as fingerprints and DNA.
 - e. Observations of witnesses which may aid in a subsequent ID of involved parties
14. Establishments should be aware that all relevant items that will further the investigation of the incident may be subject to seizure; this includes, records, videos or video recorders, images, physical items such as glasses, bottles, etc. These items may be held until final adjudication of criminal or civil proceedings arising from the incident. In some instances, employees of the establishment may be requested to provide buccal (cheek) swabs for comparison purposes.

(b) A retail licensee shall not permit at the licensed establishment the consumption of an alcoholic beverage by any of the following persons:

- (1) A person under 21 years of age;
 - (2) An intoxicated person, or any person who appears to be intoxicated; or
 - (3) A person of notoriously intemperate habits.
- (c) A licensee or other person shall not, at a licensed establishment, give, serve, deliver, or in any manner dispense an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years of age, except as provided in § 25-784(b).
- (d) A licensee shall not be liable to any person for damages claimed to arise from refusal to sell an alcoholic beverage or refusal to permit the consumption of an alcoholic beverage in its establishment under the authority of this section.

§ 25-783. Production of valid identification document required; penalty

- (a) A licensee shall refuse to sell, serve, or deliver an alcoholic beverage to any person who, upon request of the licensee, fails to produce a valid identification document.
- (b) A licensee or his agent or employee shall take steps reasonably necessary to ascertain whether any person to whom the licensee sells, delivers, or serves an alcoholic beverage is of legal drinking age. Any person who supplies a valid identification document showing his or her age to be the legal drinking age shall be deemed to be of legal drinking age.

Relevant DC Official Code Sections

§ 25-1002. Purchase, possession or consumption by persons under 21; misrepresentation of age

(a) No person who is under 21 years of age shall purchase, attempt to purchase, possess, or drink an alcoholic beverage in the District, except as provided under Subchapter IX of Chapter 7.

(b)(1) No person shall falsely represent his or her age, or possess or present as proof of age an identification document which is in any way fraudulent, for the purpose of purchasing, possessing, or drinking an alcoholic beverage in the District.

(2) No person shall present a fraudulent identification document for the purpose of entering an establishment possessing an on-premises retailer's license, an Arena C/X license, or a temporary license.

(3) For the purpose of determining valid representation of age, each person shall be required to present to the establishment owner or representative at least one form of valid identification, which shall have been issued by an agency of government (local, state, federal, or foreign) and shall contain the name, date of birth, signature, and photograph of the individual.

§ 25-781. Sale to minors or intoxicated persons prohibited

(a) The sale or delivery of alcoholic beverages to the following persons is prohibited:

(1) A person under 21 years of age, either for the person's own use or for the use of any other person, except as provided in § 25-784(b);

(2) An intoxicated person, or any person who appears to be intoxicated; or

(3) A person of notoriously intemperate habits.

Nightclub Fire Safety Best Practices

Nightclubs are one of the most challenging assembly occupancies regarding fire and life safety issues. The challenges are complicated by: loud music, limited lighting, use of fog, alcohol impairment, crowding, and the desire by promoters to use pyrotechnics, sparklers, and additional set-ups.

The District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services strives to ensure the safety of patrons through enforcement, education, and engineering.

The following list serves to assist owners/managers in identifying some of the most critical and common issues regarding fire safety in nightclubs.

1. Prior to opening, a designated employee or crowd manager needs to walk all egress paths and exits to ensure they are open and free of obstructions.
2. Establishments should ensure the proper inspection, testing and maintenance of the Fire Alarm, Standpipe Systems and or Sprinkler System and all their components. Establishments should have these records readily available for inspection.
3. Be aware of the status of all exits and keep them free and clear of any obstructions. Keep the front (main) entrance clear and free of obstructions, particularly patrons entering or waiting to enter.
4. Ensure that valet services do not block exits, fire hydrants and Fire Department Connections (FDC) to the Standpipe/Sprinkler Systems.
5. Ensure all exit signs are illuminated and working and that all emergency lighting is functioning properly. Utilize the test button to ensure its operation.
6. Pay particular attention to Fire Extinguishers. They should be present, appropriately mounted, and fully charged. Extinguishers should have current tags and be of appropriate size and type.
7. The occupant load must be known by all staff listed on the occupancy permit and posted near the entrance to each room. It must also be enforced at all times.
8. Be mindful of the placement of valet, vendors, and event set-ups. Make sure they are not placed in such a way that would interfere with emergency and or evacuation procedures.
9. If using Propane Heaters, of any type, the following regulations apply:
 - a. Requires a Fire marshal propane permit.
 - b. Propane Heaters must be at least ten (10) feet away from the building.
 - c. Propane is not allowed to be used or stored in, on, or within a structure. (Rooftops Included)
10. All staff must know and practice the emergency fire evacuation plan. Therefore, establishments must have a fire safety and evacuation plan meeting the requirements of the DC Fire Code.
11. Do not delay the notification of any fire incident to the fire department; call 911 early!
12. The use of candles is strictly limited, to the table tops of "Restaurants", within a protected globe. Candle use in a nightclub is prohibited.
13. Champagne type sparklers are considered a "pyrotechnic" device and are not permitted to be used in any indoor setting. Most are also toxic and designed for outdoor use. Pyrotechnics require a pre-approved permit and a licensed shooter, just like aerial fireworks.
14. Owners and operators must be aware of the fire ratings of interior furnishings and finishes required for the type of protected property they operate. Anything installed or used should be of the proper rating for the premises.
15. The doorperson should be readily knowledgeable as to the load within the club at any particular time. The expectation is that people get counted in and counted out, so that you always know the number of patrons.
16. Trash and combustibles should be removed from the building on a regular basis to avoid the possibility of ignition. Full trash cans are a ready source for ignition.
17. Be mindful of electrical rooms; they are not permitted to be used as storage rooms. There must be a 3' clearance in front of all electrical panels.

Counterterrorism Best Practices

This section is intended to provide nightlife establishments with information and recommendations on counterterrorism, which will allow them to plan accordingly. It is not intended to alarm or frighten, but rather to help the District's vibrant nightlife community achieve both safety and hospitality for its customers under varying circumstances.

Effective counterterrorism measures can only be achieved through cooperation. To achieve the goal of a safe DC nightlife, operators of nightlife establishments will have to work cooperatively with the police, other government agencies, nightlife industry associations, landlords, neighbors, and even competitors.

The following is a starting point for nightlife businesses to create an effective counterterrorism plan. In creating such a plan, nightlife businesses are encouraged to consult their local police district station, as well as private security and nightlife industry management consultants.

Terrorist Strategy

Terrorism is a criminal act designed to manipulate an audience beyond the immediate victims. Terrorists seek to commit acts of violence that draw local, national, and international attention to their cause. Terrorists plan their attacks to obtain the greatest publicity and choose targets that symbolize the ideologies they oppose.

Terrorist Goals

Terrorists engage in violent behaviors for the following reasons:

1. To create fear in people they consider enemies.
2. To create recognition for their ideology.
3. To provoke a reaction from governments.
4. To obtain money and equipment from their sympathizers.

Terrorist Target Selection

1. Terrorists typically use a very organized program of hostile surveillance to select targets and learn how to best attack them.
2. Target selection criteria often include: ability to inflict mass casualties; economic impact; critical infrastructure; political, religious or historical symbolism; vulnerability.
3. Terrorists have demonstrated a preference for "soft targets," those which are not protected by an effective counterterrorism plan. The process of making an entity more resistant to terrorist attacks, and therefore a more undesirable target, is therefore known as "target hardening."

Terrorism and the Nightlife Industry

The following are notable examples of terrorist attacks against nightlife establishments and examples of why it is vital that anyone who notices something strange or out of the ordinary needs to report it immediately to the authorities:

- **London 2007:** On June 29, 2007, in London, two car bombs were discovered and disabled before they could explode. The first device was set near the Tiger Tiger nightclub at around 1:30 am, and the second was nearby, in an area of London popular for its many nightlife establishments. The Tiger Tiger nightclub is the flagship of one of England's best known nightclub chains. It is 18,000 square feet in size, and contains a restaurant, four large dance floors, and five bars. The first car was reported to the police by an ambulance crew attending a minor incident at the nightclub. The ambulance crew noticed suspicious fumes coming from the parked car. About two hours later, the car containing the second device was towed because it was parked illegally. The staff at the auto pound noticed a strong smell of gasoline emanating from the vehicle and reported it to police. The cars, both late model Mercedes, were found to contain improvised explosive devices made up of gasoline, propane gas, nails, and a remote triggering device. A member of a radical Islamic group was convicted of this attempted attack.

- **London 2004:** Police counterterrorism investigators foiled a plot to use a bomb to attack the “Ministry of Sound,” the largest nightclub in London, with a capacity of 2,200 patrons. The key to foiling this plot was the alert employees of a self-storage facility where the terrorists had stored 1,300 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, the main component of what would have been a massive bomb. The employees became suspicious of the terrorists and their cache of fertilizer and contacted the police, who discovered the plot. Five terrorists were convicted and sentenced to life in prison in connection with this plot.
- **Bali 2002:** At approximately 11pm on October 12, 2002, a suicide bomber inside Paddy’s Pub nightclub detonated a bomb in his backpack, causing many patrons to flee into the street. Approximately fifteen seconds later, a secondary device, a larger and much more powerful VBIED (vehicle borne improvised explosive device, or car bomb) hidden inside a white van, was detonated in the street in front of Paddy’s Pub. This bomb was designed to kill the patrons who had fled from the first bomb inside the club. 202 people were killed by the blast, and 240 were injured. The VBIED was powerful enough to destroy neighboring buildings and shatter windows blocks away. Members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a violent Islamist group, were convicted of crimes related to the bombings.

Terrorists View Nightlife Businesses as Attractive Targets for Attacks

Terrorist target selection is often based upon the ability to inflict mass casualties, the symbolism of the target, and the vulnerability of the target. Recently, there seems to be a trend to select “soft targets,” those with less security than “hard targets,” such as government or military facilities.

Islamic extremists view nightlife establishments as “dens of depravity,” which represent Western decadence and immorality. Patrons of these businesses are viewed as sinful and deserving violent punishment.

Characteristics of Terrorist Attacks

Terrorist attacks typically involve:

1. Careful planning.
2. The smallest number of participants possible.
3. Extensive “hostile surveillance,” that is, extensive surveillance and intelligence gathering of the potential target by the terrorists.
4. The use of secondary explosions which are designed to inflict mass casualties and death on fleeing victims of the initial explosion, and on emergency personnel who respond to the initial explosion.

Counterterrorism Awareness and Response Plans for Nightlife Establishments

1. Each establishment should have a “Counterterrorism Awareness and Response Plan.” It should be simple, clear, and flexible.
2. Establishments should assign responsibility for counterterrorism awareness and security planning to one senior managerial employee, usually the same person responsible for other types of security. This individual should have sufficient resources and authority to accomplish this responsibility.
3. The Counterterrorism Awareness and Response Plan should include:
 - a. Details of the security measures to be implemented, including personnel assigned to carry them out, with designated back-up personnel assignments.
 - b. How to respond to a threat, such as a bomb threat or threat of attack delivered by telephone or in person.
 - c. How to respond to the discovery of a suspicious device.
 - d. A search plan. Searches should be conducted daily, before, during and after hours of operation.
 - e. An emergency evacuation plan.
 - f. A communications plan, which includes instructions for liaison with the police and other emergency services, and guidance for dealing with inquiries from the media, and inquiries from concerned family members.

4. The Counterterrorism Awareness and Response plan should include the “Seven Key Instructions,” for dealing with most incidents involving the discovery of an unusual situation or a suspicious item or package:
 1. Notify the police immediately.
 2. Do not touch the suspicious items.
 3. Move EVERYONE away to a safe distance. Remain behind hard cover.
 4. Prevent others from approaching the suspicious item.
 5. Communicate with staff and patrons in a manner designed not to create alarm.
 6. Do not use radios and cellular phones in the immediate vicinity of the suspicious item.
 7. Ensure that witnesses – whoever found the item or witnessed the incident – remain present to talk to the police.
5. All staff should be trained on the counterterrorism awareness and response plan so that they understand their responsibilities, and have a general understanding of sound counterterrorism practices. Refresher training and training of new employees should be conducted periodically. Constant vigilance is the most important concept to be conveyed to the staff.
6. All staff should be trained as to when and how to notify the police and senior management. Management should be notified whenever staff notices anything unusual or suspicious in any way. The police should be notified any time a possible threat exists. Call 911 for emergencies and crimes occurring or about to occur. For example, call 911 if an employee believes the establishment is currently being subject to hostile terrorist surveillance. For documented or suspected terrorist or terrorist-related activities or actions, which come to light AFTER THE FACT, MPD’s Command Information Center should be notified on its “iWATCH Tip Line” at (202) 727-9099. For example, call the hot line if an employee recalls seeing activity in the past that may have been indicative of terrorist hostile surveillance or other activity.

Physical Security and Counterterrorism

1. Access points between the private and public areas of the establishment should be minimized and controlled with an access control system. At the minimum, all such access points should be secured and monitored.
2. All patrons and independent contractors (such as promoters, dancers, DJs, sound and light technicians, etc.) should be searched upon entering the establishment. Use of magnetometers and metal detectors should be considered.
3. The establishment should be searched routinely before, during, and after hours of operation.
4. Staff should be instructed to ensure that vehicles discharging or picking up passengers do not stay in place for any longer than is absolutely necessary.
5. Anti-shatter glass should be installed in the location wherever practical. Many injuries from explosive devices are caused by shattering glass. Anti-shatter film may be applied to glass already in place.
6. Alarm systems, CCTV systems, access control systems, lighting systems, and patron identification recording systems should all be integrated to the extent possible, to allow them to work together and maximize their effectiveness. For example, additional exterior lighting on the main entrance of an establishment will make the CCTV coverage of that entrance much more effective. Similarly, CCTV coverage of the alarm trigger points in the security system will allow for remote assessment of alarm conditions.
7. Good maintenance and housekeeping practices keep an establishment attractive to patrons and also reduce the opportunity for the hiding of suspicious devices. Maintenance staff should be included in counterterrorism planning and training. Their vigilance is important to detect suspicious devices and events, such as disabled access control systems.

Video Surveillance Systems in Counterterrorism Efforts

1. Video surveillance systems are very technical and complicated to install. They should be professionally installed and maintained, and the employees responsible for their use and maintenance should be appropriately trained by professionals.
2. Video surveillance cameras should be constantly monitored and recorded. Recordings should be kept for a minimum of 30 days. The quality of the recordings should be regularly checked, ensuring that the images are clear and that the date and time stamps are accurate.
3. Sufficient staff should be trained on the use of the video surveillance system to allow it to be continually monitored during an incident.
4. There should be a system in place to immediately turn necessary recordings over to the police for use in an investigation or as evidence.
5. Lighting should be appropriate to ensure good image quality of the video surveillance images.
6. Older analog systems use video tape to record images. These tapes degrade quickly and should be reused no more than 12 times.

Searching Establishments as Part of a Counterterrorism Security Plan

1. Search plans should be created in advance and should be memorialized onto a checklist. The checklist should be completed each time the establishment is searched. Searches should be conducted daily, before, during and after hours of operations. Searches can be incorporated as part of the routine cleaning and maintenance of the establishment.
2. The search should also be performed when accompanying the police in response to a specific threat against an establishment, such as a telephone bomb threat. In these cases it is much more effective to have the responding police officers accompanied by employees who routinely search the establishment. It will be easier for these employees to recognize out of place, unusual, or suspicious items than it would be for police officers who may have never seen the establishment before.

Door Supervisors

The Counterterrorism Awareness and Response Plan should include the following instructions for security staff (especially door supervisors):

1. Security staff should be alert to what is going on outside of the establishment as well as at the door.
2. Security staff should understand and be able to identify hostile surveillance.
3. Security staff should understand and be able to identify indications of suicide bombers and VBIEDs.
4. Consistent with the establishment's Security Plan and Counterterrorism Awareness and Reaction Plan, patrons and employees of the establishment should be searched, their ID scanned, and checked with a metal detecting magnetometer.
5. Security staff should pay particular attention to fraudulent and forged identification documents. People using apparently forged ID documents who do not appear to be underage are very suspicious, and should be immediately brought to the attention of the police.
6. Establishments should be aware that DC law requires that all security personnel be licensed.

Evacuation Plan

1. All establishments should have a written evacuation plan. All employees should be trained on the plan, understand their specific responsibilities under the plan, and should have a general understanding of the workings of the plan.
2. The evacuation plan must include clear communication to staff and patrons. All routes, exit plans and assembly areas must be well defined. Staff members should be trained to act as marshals (leaders/coordinators) and contacts once the evacuation assembly area is reached. The plan should include at least two alternative evacuation assembly areas.

3. In case of an evacuation the establishment must notify the police regarding the reason for the evacuation, and the evacuation route and the assembly area being used.
4. Establishments should notify neighboring businesses and consult with them when designing an evacuation plan to ensure that both establishments are not planning on using the same assembly areas.
5. Small maps of various evacuation routes can be printed on the reverse of employee's ID cards and/or access control cards.
6. When designing evacuation plans, establishments should remember that secondary explosives are used by terrorists to inflict casualties on people fleeing an initial attack. Therefore, the evacuation plan should include alternate assembly areas. This will make the use of a secondary device at the assembly area more difficult for the terrorists.

Communications

Part of an effective counterterrorism plan is to ensure an effective communications strategy is in place.

1. The communications strategy must be multilayered. It is important to maintain ongoing communication on counterterrorism issues with groups such as employees and vendors who are routinely present in your establishment. It is also important to have a plan for communication with police, neighboring premises, and possibly the media.
2. The communications plan must include emergency communications during an incident. Establishments will have to communicate with patrons, staff, police, and neighboring premises in these types of situations.
3. Cellular telephones may not be functioning during an emergency. Larger establishments should consider the use of hand held radios for emergency communications. All establishments should consider the installation of a hard-wired (land-line) pulse dial analog telephone which will function during power failures.

Hostile Surveillance

1. Terrorists use hostile surveillance as part of the target selection process and to learn as much as possible about their targets before an attack. These actions can occur weeks to years before a terrorist attack.
2. Hostile surveillance is usually conducted in a covert manner, with the terrorists conducting the surveillance pretending to be tourists, students, or customers. It is often characterized by activities such as photography, videography, sketching or drawing, and note taking. Often the person or persons conducting the hostile surveillance will take particular interest in the outside of a potential target, paying particular attention to the doors, alarm systems, video surveillance system, parking lots, security personnel and security plans. Sometimes these individuals may engage employees and ask questions about the establishment's operations and its security plans.
3. Another indicator of potential hostile surveillance may include an increase in bomb threats and unattended packages. These may be used as an opportunity for the terrorists to observe police and security responses to these incidents.
4. Door Supervisors and security staff should also be aware of new characters on the streetscape surrounding the establishment. These could include vendors, panhandlers, and loiterers.
5. All of the activities mentioned above should be reported to management, who should make a determination whether the incident is serious enough to bring to the attention of the police.

Identification of Suicide Bombers

1. Counterterrorism security plans should include training for all staff in the detection of possible suicide bombers. There are many factors which may create suspicion of this activity: inappropriate clothing for the season, time, place or circumstance; protrusions from the clothing; concealment of the hands; visible wires or tape; two or more people communicating and trying not to be observed; a suspect whose presence or behavior is inconsistent with the time or place; individuals who are obviously disguised; individuals with obvious signs of extreme stress or nervousness, such as bulging veins in the

neck, profuse sweating, shaking hands, touching the face continuously, involuntary motions, apathy, distant stare or unfocused gazing, feeling the body continuously; and individuals whose speech includes stuttering, mumbling or chanting, or are hesitant or unresponsive.

2. Suspicious luggage or packages on an individual should also be noted. Indicators include: individuals holding luggage which is incompatible with the surroundings; holding a bag very close to the body or not releasing it when appropriate; weight of bag is obviously great; identical bags carried by several individuals; and bags with obvious irregularities.
3. In all situations, part of the counterterrorism security plan should be to encourage all security and establishment staff to trust their gut feelings. If they feel suspicious or uneasy about an individual or a group of people they should bring their suspicion to the attention of a security supervisor with responsibility for counterterrorism security.
4. Terrorists are not confined to one ethnic or racial group. There have been documented terrorist attacks by individuals of a wide variety of backgrounds. It is therefore important to stress in counterterrorism planning the need to be vigilant and observe all people, and not to exclude individuals from suspicion because of their appearance. Personnel should be mindful of the increased participation of females in terrorist activity.

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)

1. Terrorists have often employed explosive devices hidden inside cars or other vehicles.
2. The use of bollards or other physical barriers to vehicles may be considered, but their use must be consistent with local traffic and other District regulations and permit requirements.
3. Counterterrorism training should stress to all staff that all vehicles are to be scrutinized for irregular operation or suspicious activity, including luxury vehicles, limousines, taxicabs, and vehicles purportedly carrying VIPs.
4. Suspicious activity or irregular or unusual operation by any vehicle should be reported to the police.

Recommendations

1. **Learn.** Stay informed regarding world and local events, and any ongoing threats. The MPD iWATCH website (www.mpdc.dc.gov/iwatch) is a good source of current and reliable counterterrorism information.
2. **Communicate and Cooperate.** Maintain good lines of communication with the police, industry associations, your landlord, your neighbors, and even your competition. It is in all of our interests to ensure that the nightlife industry continues to provide a safe and fun environment for its customers. Terrorism is a societal problem which no single entity can address alone. To have effective counterterrorism planning, we must all work together and communicate effectively.
3. **Plan.** Every business should have a counterterrorism plan. The execution of this plan should be the responsibility of a senior, management level employee. The plan should be written, with specific assignments for staff members. The plan should include back-up assignments to account for staff absenteeism, days off, and terminations. The plan should also include initial training and periodic retraining and drills.
4. **Be Vigilant.** The culture of your organization must be changed to stress vigilance on counterterrorism and safety issues. Cultural change in organizations starts at the top, with ownership and senior management. All people involved in your organization must understand the focus that is to be placed on looking for suspicious activities and reporting them. Your counterterrorism plan must give specific directions as to when and how to notify the police and establishment management.
5. **Become a Hard Target.** The goal of a successful counterterrorism plan is to make your establishment a "hard target," one that is not perceived by terrorists as desirable to attack. Many factors lead to becoming a hard target, including: increased security, regular searches, counterterrorism drills with staff, visible CCTV cameras, counterterrorism planning, training of staff, and a culture of vigilance.

Attachments

1. MPD iWATCH Bomb Threat Checklist
Useful when a bomb threat is received over the telephone
2. MPD iWATCH Guidelines for Suspicious Mail or Packages
3. MPD iWATCH Criminal Description Form
Useful whenever a description of any person needs to be recorded
4. MPD "If you see something, say something" Poster
5. Incident Report

BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

CALL 911 Remain calm and try to keep caller on the line. **CALL 911**

EXACT WORDS OF CALLER:

Questions to ask the caller:

1. When is the bomb going to explode? _____
2. Where is the bomb right now? _____
3. What does the bomb look like? _____
4. What kind of bomb is it? _____
5. What will cause the bomb to explode? _____
6. Did you place the bomb? _____ Why? _____
7. Where are you? _____
8. What is your name? _____
9. What organization do you represent? _____

VOICE

Loud

Soft

Intoxicated

High Pitched

Deep

Accent

MANNER

Calm

Coherent

Angry

Emotional

Laughing

Other

BACKGROUND NOISE

Street

Bar/Restaurant

Factory

Subway

Office

Other

Was caller male or female? _____

Was caller's voice familiar? _____

Did caller read a prepared statement? _____

Was caller well spoken? _____

What was approximate age of caller? _____

Telephone number where call was received? _____

Time call received: _____ Date call received: _____

Your name: _____ Your position: _____

Your telephone number: _____

SUSPICIOUS MAIL OR PACKAGES

- Leave the mail or package where it was found. Do not disturb. Do not try to clean the substance.
- Immediately call **911**
- Clear the immediate area of all persons and keep others away.
- Cordon off the immediate area.
- Instruct people in the immediate area to wash hands and other exposed skin with soap and water.
- Isolate exposed persons to a designated area away from the substance and await further instruction.
- List the names of the persons in the immediate area of the mail or package.
- Shut down all HVAC (heating, ventilation, air conditioning) systems.
- Document the location of mail or package.



INCIDENT REPORT

PAGE 1 OF 2

ESTABLISHMENT INFORMATION

Corporate Name		Doing Business As	
Date of Incident	Time of Incident <input type="checkbox"/> AM <input type="checkbox"/> PM	Location of Incident <input type="checkbox"/> Coat Check <input type="checkbox"/> Bar <input type="checkbox"/> Rest Room <input type="checkbox"/> Dance Floor <input type="checkbox"/> Outside <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)	
Report Prepared By		Signature	Date of Report

PATRONS INVOLVED OR WITNESSING INCIDENT (Use Additional Form(s) if Necessary)

1. Name Victim Aggressor Witness Race White Black White Hispanic Black Hispanic Other (Specify) Amer. Ind. Asian/Pacific Islander

Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female	Height	Weight	Eye Color	Hair Color	Date of Birth	ID Source
Address		Apt. No.	City		State	Zip Code
Home Phone No.	Cellphone No.	Business Phone No.	Fax No.		Email Address	
Vehicle Make/Model/Color					License Plate	
Distinguishing Marks (Describe Any Scars Tattoos etc.)						

Was Patron Asked Yes No To Leave Premises? Patron Escorted Yes No From Premises? If Yes, How Was Patron Escorted From Premises

Did Patron Resist? Yes No If Yes, Describe

Was Intoxication Noticeable Before Or After The Incident? Yes No

2. Name Victim Aggressor Witness Race White Black White Hispanic Black Hispanic Other (Specify) Amer. Ind. Asian/Pacific Islander

Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female	Height	Weight	Eye Color	Hair Color	Date of Birth	ID Source
Address		Apt. No.	City		State	Zip Code
Home Phone No.	Cellphone No.	Business Phone No.	Fax No.		Email Address	
Vehicle Make/Model/Color					License Plate	
Distinguishing Marks (Describe Any Scars Tattoos etc.)						

Was Patron Asked Yes No To Leave Premises? Patron Escorted Yes No From Premises? If Yes, How Was Patron Escorted From Premises

Did Patron Resist? Yes No If Yes, Describe

Was Intoxication Noticeable Before Or After The Incident? Yes No

3. Name Victim Aggressor Witness Race White Black White Hispanic Black Hispanic Other (Specify) Amer. Ind. Asian/Pacific Isl.

Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female	Height	Weight	Eye Color	Hair Color	Date of Birth	ID Source
Address		Apt. No.	City		State	Zip Code
Home Phone No.	Cellphone No.	Business Phone No.	Fax No.		Email Address	
Vehicle Make/Model/Color					License Plate or Taxi Medallion No.	
Distinguishing Marks (Describe Any Scars Tattoos etc.)						

Was Patron Asked Yes No To Leave Premises? Patron Escorted Yes No From Premises? If Yes, How Was Patron Escorted From Premises

Did Patron Resist? Yes No If Yes, Describe

Was Intoxication Noticeable Before Or After The Incident? Yes No

INCIDENT REPORT

PAGE 2 OF 2

POLICE INFORMATION

Were Police Called? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Responding Officer (Rank, Name)	Officer's Badge No.
Visible Injuries to Patron(s):		Complaint Report Taken? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Were Medical Services Offered? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Were Medical Services Refused? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Did EMS/Ambulance Service Respond? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
		Patron(s) Removed? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Employees Involved (Describe How Below)

Name _____ Home Phone No. _____ Cell Phone No. _____

Name _____ Home Phone No. _____ Cell Phone No. _____

Name _____ Home Phone No. _____ Cell Phone No. _____

Employees Witnessing Incident

Name _____ Home Phone No. _____ Cell Phone No. _____

Name _____ Home Phone No. _____ Cell Phone No. _____

Name _____ Home Phone No. _____ Cell Phone No. _____

Is There Video Surveillance of Premises? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Was Incident Captured on Video? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Was ID Scanned Upon Entry? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	If Not, Was Record Made of ID? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
Was Any Physical Evidence Recovered? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		If Yes, Describe Evidence	

DESCRIBE INCIDENT (Use Additional Form if Necessary)

Attachments Incident Report

Attachments Incident Report



**THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA**
One City, One Government, One Voice



VINCENT C. GRAY
Mayor



CATHY L. LANIER
Chief of Police